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against a stevedore whose breach of the warranty of workmanlike per

The court also rejected Selvick's claim that it was an intended ben

formance, implicit in the stevedoring contract, resulted in injuries for
which the shipowner was held liable. Its purpose was to make the

eficiary of the stone supply contract between Valders and C-Way.
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sees. 302, 304

party responsible for the injuries pay for the result of its negligence.

(1981), the court held that Selvick was only an incidental beneficiary

But while the court noted that the Ryan doctrine might no longer be

and, therefore, not entitled to damages from Valders. Finally, as

valid, (in light of the adoption by a number of circuits of the policy of

Selvick was unable to produce any evidence to substantiate its claim

apportioning liability according to the comparative fault of each party

as an intended beneficiary to the contract, the court held that Valders

as opposed to following indemnity principles espoused in Ryan), the

was accountable only to C-Way for any breach caused by the alleged

court did point out that it was unnecessary to decide its validity

negligence of Strauss.

Stephen W. Beyer '92

because Selvick's claim fell outside the scope of Ryan. The warranty
runs against the stevedore, not against the cargo owner who had mere
ly hired the stevedore, and in this case Selvick was suing the cargo
owner, Valders, and not the stevedore, Strauss.

HINES V. BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 23 July 1990
907 F.2d 726

Absent an express contractual provision to supervise stevedoring operations, a time charterer has no general duty to do so, and is not liable
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act for the injuries or death of a longshoreman arising out of such operations.
FACTS: On October 3, 1987, Clark Hines (Hines), a longshoreman

ISSUE: Did BSC, a time charterer, owe a duty to Ceres, an indepen

who was employed by Ceres Terminals, Inc. (Ceres), was killed while

dent stevedoring contractor, to supervise the stevedoring operations

performing stevedoring duties aboard the M.S. Ravenna (the

aboard the Ravenna?

Ravenna). British Steel Corporation (BSC) had time chartered the

ANALYSIS: In Scindia, the Supreme Court interpreted the vessel's

Ravenna from its owner, Roscoe Shipping, S.A., and had docked the

duty to inspect or supervise the stevedore's cargo operations under the

vessel in Chicago on October 1, 1987 to unload a cargo of steel. The

1972 amendments to 33 U.S.C. 905(b) as nonexistent. The court held

master and the crew of the Ravenna were employees of Roscoe

that a shipowner "is not liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by

Shipping.

dangers unknown to him." Although Scindia involved a shipowner

Just prior to the accident, the steel had been completely unloaded

and not a time charterer, the principles discussed there apply with

from the Ravenna. Hines and other Ceres employees were clearing

equal force to the present case.

dunnage (pieces of lumber used to protect cargo during transport) out

In this case, the crane was in good working condition, the danger

of the ship's holds. Captain Tore Sorenson, a Ceres superintendent,

ous act of the crane operator was unforeseeable, and the BSC cargo

was in charge of the stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. At

representative was not on board the vessel at the time of the accident.

the time of the accident, BSC's cargo representative, John Folan, was

Under these conditions, the court found, BSC is not liable pursuant to

not on board the vessel.

Scindia, absent an express contractual agreement. Appellant argued
that BSC contractually undertook control of the stevedoring opera

An unused bundle of dunnage was secured with Ceres owned
slings to one of the ship's cranes. The crane operator then improperly

tions and therefore had a duty of care to the Ceres employees under

swung the loaded crane over the open hatch of the hold in which the

Restatement of Torts (Second) 414. The court noted that the com

men were working. Swinging a loaded crane over an open hatch while

ments to Section 414 suggest that the right to make recommendations,

men are working below is a forbidden activity and Ceres crane opera

to inspect, and to order work stopped or resumed is not enough to

tors are instructed not to do so. For no discernible reason, the bundle

constitute retention of control, and that there must be a retention such

of dunnage fell from the crane and struck a dumpster in the hold. The

that the stevedore cannot do the work in his own manner. The court

bundle broke apart, and pieces of flying dunnage struck Hines, who

also noted that few courts have applied Section 414 in the context of a

later died.

lawsuit under Section 904(b) of the LHWCA, but the Supreme Court

Rachelle Hines, wife of the decedent, brought this action as special

in Scindia recognized the Restatement as a useful analytical tool.

administrator of his estate under the Longshore and Harbor Workers

However, the court also remarked that Section 414 does not address

(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §905 (b), against BSC to recover damages for

the contractual relationship between BSC and Roscoe Shipping.

her husband's death. She filed the suit in the Circuit Court of Cook

Accordingly, it is applicable only to the various agreements between

County, Illinois, but BSC removed it to the United States District

BSC and Ceres. Since BSC did not retain the requisite degree of con

Court for the Northern District Of Illinois. BSC then moved for sum

trol of stevedoring operations outlined in Section 414, no duty is

mary judgment on the grounds that it had no general duty to supervise

imposed on BSC by this section.

stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. The plaintiff asserted that

Appellant further argued that clause 8 of the charter agreement

the various agreements BSC made with Ceres and Roscoe Shipping

between BSC and Roscoe Shipping, together with paragraph "j" of

showed a clear intent by BSC to control Ceres unloading operations.

BSC's instructions to the ship's Master, gave BSC control over the

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BSC,

discharging of the cargo. Paragraph "j" gave BSC the right to appoint

fmding that BSC was amenable to suite under the LHWCA but con

a stevedore, who was to remain under the direct control of the ship's

cluding that the Supreme Court decision in Scindia Steam Navigation

Master. Clause 8 of the charter party provided in relevant part that the

Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) precluded a finding

captain would be under the orders of BSC and that BSC was to "load,

that BSC had a general duty to oversee Ceres operations. The court

stow, trim and discharge the cargo at its own expense but such

found that the language of the charter party, together with Captain

stowage shall be conducted by and under the control of the Master

Sorenson's testimony that Folan took no part in the actual stevedoring

and the Owners shall be responsible for the proper stowage and cor

operations, indicated that BSC had no special duty to ensure the safe

rect delivery of the cargo." The court observed that clause 8 is a stan-

ty of the longshoremen. Rachelle Hines appealed the decision.
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dard provision in a charter party. Spence v. Mariehamns RIS, 766 F.2d

right to make suggestions, and to the ten pages of instructions on

1504 (11th Circ. 1985). But, the court stated, the amended part of
clause 8 included in the charter party between BSC and Roscoe

proper handling of BSC cargo given to Ceres. The court concluded
that Folan merely regulated the proper handling of BSC cargo so as to

Shipping did not place the responsibility of proper discharge of cargo

avoid any damage to it, and that the ten pages of instructions were

BSC. lrby v. Tokai Lines, 1990 WL 18880, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis

simply a "laundry list" of suggestions on how to handle the various

2116 (E.D.PA. Feb 23, 1990).
The court concluded that the plain language of clause 8 contained
no suggestion that BSC had a duty to supervise, and that the appeiJant

products BSC ships. BSC in fact retained no actual control over the
stevedoring operations. Therefore, no duty could be imposed on BSC
to ensure the safety of the longshoremen.

on

failed to present any extrinsic proof that BSC and Roscoe Shipping

As the depositions of Sorenson and Folan support the finding that

meant to impose such a duty. Therefore, the court rejected Mrs.

BSC was not in any way involved in the operative control of the

Hines' contention that clause 8 was an agreement between the parties

stevedoring operations, and as Sorenson testified that the responsibili

placing the responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen during

ty to ensure the safety of his workers was his own, the Court of
Appeals found no general duty, under Scindia, for BSC to supervise

cargo operations on BSC.
AppelJant's fmal argument was that BSC had such control over the
stevedoring operations as to raise a duty on BSC's behalf to ensure the
safety of Ceres employees. She calJed attention to the right of BSC's
cargo representative to be present during the discharging of cargo, his

stevedoring operations, and no contractual agreements imposing such
a duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of BSC.
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AFRAM LINES INTERN., INC. V. M/V CAPETAN YIANNIS
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 19 June 1990
905 F.2d 347

Absent extraordinary circumstances, plaintiff need not post countersecurity in amounts exceeding the security of the original claim when
the plaintiff does not seek to release its property from the counterplaintitT's custody and when the counterplaintitT cannot proceed in rem
or quasi in rem.
FACTS: In December, 1987 Brotherhood Shipping Company, Ltd.

its discretion in requiring Afram to post the sum.

(Brotherhood), owner of the M/V Capetan Yiannis (the vessel)
entered an agreement with a nonparty, Grant Shipping Company, and
Afram Lines International, Inc. (Afram), a Florida corporation. Under
the agreements the vessel was to be subchartered to Afram and was to
carry cargo for Afram from Milwaukee, Wis., to West Africa. The
vessel would be commanded by a Brotherhood employee.

In its decision the court looked first at Rule E(7). The court found
that the rule stands for the proposition that in the event of a counter
claim, where the defendant had given security to respond in damages,
the plaintiff shall give security in the usual amount and form to
respond in damages to the claims found in the counterclaim, unless
the court, for cause shown, otherwise directs. The purpose of the rule,
the court noted, is to "place the parties on an equality as regards to
security."
Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1924). The court further found
that to effectuate Rule E(7) the district court has broad discretion to
determine whether, and to what amounts, countersecurity shall be
posted.
Despite this broad discretion, the court stated that the district court
should consider several factors. For example, it should be reluctant to
order countersecurity if the plaintiff does not, by the posting of coun
tersecurity, seek to release its property from the counterplaintiff's cus
tody. Expert Diesel, Inc. v. The Yacht "Fishin' Fool", 627 F. Supp.
432 (S.D.Fla.l986). The court also held that it should be determined
whether the counterplaintiff could have brought an action in rem or
quasi in rem for in the event that the counterplaintiff could not have
proceeded in this manner, there would be little reason to require a
larger bond on the counterclaim than on the original claim. In addi
tion, the court held that the district court should look at the plaintiff's
financial ability to post the countersecurity. Finally, the court held, it
should be considered to what extent the counterclaim may be
frivolous.
Applying the facts, the court of appeals concluded that Afram did
not seek to release any of its property form Brotherhood's custody by
posting countersecurity. It also found that Brotherhood could not pro
ceed in rem or quasi in rem and that Brotherhood sought its recovery
from Afram in personam. With these two factors present, the court
ruled that district courts should not, absent extraordinary circum
stances, require claimants, like Afram, to post countersecurity in an
amount which exceeds the security posted on the original claim. Thus
the court held that the district court had abused its discretion when it
ordered Afram to post full countersecurity.

On December 12, 1987 the parties took the vessel to the port of
Milwaukee and began to load cargo. On December 14, the harbormas
ter issued a notice to alJ affected vessels of an impending storm. After
allegedly receiving ambiguous advice from Afram's Milwaukee rep
resentative, the vessel master decided to keep the vessel tied to the
dock. During the storm the vessel's mooring lines split and the vessel
was pushed repeatedly against the dock causing both vessel and dock
substantial structural damage.
Afram promptly filed an action in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
seeking recovery in rem against the vessel and in personam from
Brotherhood for S1.7 million in damages for Brotherhood's alleged
negligence, conversion, and breach of the subcharter agreement. In
response to Afram's demand of security Brotherhood agreed with
Afram to post a $440,000.00 bank guarantee, thereby avoiding arrest
of the vessel.
Afram then instituted an action in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida. Brotherhood filed an answer and a
counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that Brotherhood had sus
tained damages in the amount of $4,724, 4 7 5 . 7 4 which was
attributable to Afram's own conduct. After filing the answer and
counterclaim Brotherhood filed a motion pursuant to Rule E(7) of the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
(Rule E(7)), to compel Afram to post countersecurity. The district
court granted the motion and ordered Afram to post security to the
full stated amount of Brotherhood's claim. Afram filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Afram appealed the decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

ISSUE: Did the district court err in ordering the plaintiff to post
countersecurity in amounts exceeding the security of the original
claim when the plaintiff did not, by posting countersecurity, seek to
release its property from the counterplaintiff's custody and when the
counterplaintiff could not bring an action in rem or quasi in rem?

John Froitzheim '92

ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated
the order of the district court, fmding that the district court had abused
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